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We investigate in this paper whether the modernisation hypothesis holds in Latin
America, and our sample includes nine Latin American countries that re-democratised
in the last forty years or so. The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007,
and the results, based on dynamic panel data analysis (we use the Fixed E⁄ects,
Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables, DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM estimators),
suggest that the modernisation hypothesis holds in the region, or that income, or
development in general, play a positive role on democracy. We also test for the critical
junctures hypothesis, or whether particular historical structural changes play any role
in contemporaneous democratisation in the region, however we are not able to provide
any concrete evidence in favour of it. Essentially, we suggest that a certain level of
development is an important condition for democracy to mature and survive, which￿
in times of a new democratisation wave taking place in societies with di⁄erent levels
of development￿ is a suggestive observation.
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JEL Classi￿cation: O10, O54, P16.I. Introduction and Summary
Latin America has been known for some time now for numerous political transitions from
(mostly right wing) dictatorships to more democratic regimes, macroeconomic instability
(some countries experienced debt crisis and high rates of in￿ ation in the 1980s), delayed
stabilisation processes (in the spirit of Alesina and Drazen (1991)) and, at least recently,
no come back to less democratic regimes during this latest democratisation wave which has
a⁄ected the region in the last forty years or so. Moreover, the region has been known for a
certain, relatively above the average, degree of economic inequality.
Against this rather eventful background, and also with the current wave of democratisa-
tion being experienced by some Arab countries in mind, we investigate whether the moderni-
sation hypothesis holds (or whether democracy needs a precondition to mature and survive,
which is basically a certain level of income and development already in place) as proposed
by Lipset (1959), in a region which has experienced its own recent wave of democratisation
in the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. It is worth stressing at this stage that this latest
wave of democratisation in Latin America was not its only one, nor its ￿rst one. In fact,
democratic institutions were implemented in the region a number of times before, however
democracy had been far from stable in Latin America in its more distant past.
In addition, we test for the critical junctures hypothesis, or whether democracy (or lack
of it) in the region is being determined by a particular shock, or structural change, which
a⁄ected the region in the very distant past. For that, we follow the previous literature
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008 and 2009)) and make use of a proxy for
institutional quality, in this case constraints on the executive right after independence, in an
attempt to understand the role of the institutional build up after independence in the 19th
century on contemporaneous democracy in the region. This is of some importance because
there were crucial di⁄erences within the American continent in terms of institutional quality
right after independence. For instance, the United States shortly after independence already
presented, according to the Polity IV ￿les, fairly e⁄ective constraints on the executive, whilst
1most of the Latin American countries did not fare at all impressively on that respect.
To conduct the analysis we use data from nine Latin American countries which re-
democratised at some point in the last forty years or so, and given data availability, we cover
the period between 1970 and 2007. For the empirical analysis we make use of dynamic panel
data analysis. More speci￿cally, we use the Fixed E⁄ects, Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental
Variables, First Di⁄erence and SYSTEM Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In terms of results, ￿rstly we ￿nd some evidence that the modernisation hypothesis
actually holds in the region, or that income, or development in general, play an important
positive role on democracy. Secondly, we do not ￿nd any conclusive evidence for the critical
junctures hypothesis, or that the institutional change happening right after independence in
the region has had any impact on contemporaneous democratisation.
The subject has, in one way or another, always attracted the attention of the profession
(economists and political scientists alike), and, as mentioned above, Lipset (1959) is consid-
ered to be the ￿rst paper on the subject. Essentially the paper sets the social requisites,
or the set of conditions necessary for democracy to mature, which are wealth (income), ur-
banisation and education. Incidentally, the paper also suggests that democracy would only
mature and thrive in Latin America with more development in general.
More recently, Barro (1999), using a sample of 100 countries between 1960 and 1995, and
the SUR estimator, reports an e⁄ect of income per capita on democracy, or some evidence for
the modernisation hypothesis. On the other hand, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared
(2005) using data covering the period between 1965 and 2000, ￿nd no evidence supporting the
role of education on democracy when allowing for ￿xed e⁄ects (or for particular idiosyncrasies
within the sample used) in their regressions.
On the contrary, Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen and O￿ Halloran (2006), using
Tobit and Markov regressions, and a cross-section of countries, are able to report some evi-
dence in favour of the modernisation hypothesis. Furthermore, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer
(2007) provide some descriptive evidence of the role of education on democracy between 1960
2and 2000 in a panel of countries, and then a theoretical model on the importance of skills,
socialisation and civic engagement (all attributes related to human capital formation) for
democracy to survive and mature.
On a di⁄erent vein, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008 and 2009) use
panel estimators to suggest this time that there is no link between income and democracy
when allowing for ￿xed e⁄ects in di⁄erent sets of samples covering the last 100 years or
so. They also regress the constraints on the executive right after independence alongside
income against democracy in an attempt to disentangle the historical institutional di⁄erences
a⁄ecting di⁄erent former colonies, and they report that the historical variable is important,
and that income is still not signi￿cant on democracy. All in all, they report some evidence
in favour of the critical junctures hypothesis and very little evidence for the modernisation
story.
Moreover, Benhabib, Corvalan and Spiegel (2011) using data for the 1955-2000 period
and the Vanhanen￿ s index for democracy, which is unbounded and that allows for the fact
that democracy is in constant change and evolution over time, are able to report that the
modernisation hypothesis holds in their panel; and Murtin and Wacziarg (2011) using a
historical data set covering the period between 1870 and 2000, panel estimators and a new
variable for education (as a substitute for the Barro-Lee data set), are able to report that
primary schooling and income are positively associated with democracy1.
Essentially, the literature presents us with interesting controversies which can only enrich
the debate about the role of income and development on democracy. Given the above, and
bearing in mind the fact that there are always waves of democratisation a⁄ecting di⁄erent
parts of the world with di⁄erent levels of development, so the need to better understand
those processes, the value added of this paper to the literature is that we make use of a
sample of Latin American countries (all sharing some developing countries characteristics,
but with their own idiosyncrasies), which went through structural political and economic
changes (not to mention severe shocks) in the last forty years or so. This is interesting in
3itself because with this sample we can disaggregate and comparatively further our knowledge
on how democracy and development have been behaving and interacting with each other in
recent times in the region. Furthermore, we use di⁄erent dynamic panel data estimators,
which tackle di⁄erent empirical issues, to make sure that our results are robust. It is therefore
believed that we are able to provide some interesting evidence to speci￿cally understand the
recent history of Latin America, instead of treating the region either as an outlier to be
removed from the sample, or as a dummy variable.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: in the next sections we describe the data set,
the empirical methodology used, and then we present and discuss the main results obtained.
We then conclude and o⁄er some future research avenues that can be pursued from here.
II. Empirical Analysis
A. A Look at the Data
The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and nine Latin American coun-
tries which transitioned from political dictatorship to full democracy at some point in the
late 1970s (Ecuador), 1980s (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay), and early
1990s (Guyana and Paraguay).
The variable used to measure democracy is the rather popular, and normalised (ranging
from zero to one), polity variable from the Polity IV data set (POLITY ) which is basically
the di⁄erence between the democracy and autocracy indices. Information on GDP per capita
(GDP) comes from the Penn World Table, and in this case it is expected, according to the
modernisation hypothesis, that income might play an important positive and signi￿cant role
on democracy. In addition, and again in accordance with the main hypothesis being tested
here, we use the variable urbanisation (URBAN) which comes from the World Development
Indicators provided by the World Bank. In this case we expect that more urbanised societies
tend to be also more developed and therefore more democratic.
Moreover, we include the Polity IV variable constraints on the executive (XCONST)
4right after independence, which works as a proxy for institutional quality, or checks and
balances, to test for the critical junctures hypothesis. What is expected here (apart from
the fact that income does not play any role on democracy), is that at those particular
critical historical moments at the beginning of the 19th century those countries in the sample
experienced deep structural changes which would, depending on the quality of the institutions
adopted, a⁄ect democratisation much later on in time, for the better or for the worse2.
To brie￿ y illustrate the main hypothesis to be tested, in Figure One we plot the behav-
iour of democracy (POLITY ) and income (GDP), averaged series, against time. Essentially,
the ￿rst panel illustrates the behaviour of democracy in the region, and we can visualise the
steady democratisation wave a⁄ecting the region in the last forty years or so. It can also
be seen that in the 1970s there was a mild backdrop to less democratic regimes, which
presumably illustrates well the Argentinian political instability at the time. Moreover, the
second panel illustrates how income per capita has been behaving in the region since the
1970s, and apart from the positive trend, we can also see the ￿ lost decade￿in the 1980s. All
in all, although some important troughs occurred during the period, which provide us with
important variation, in general terms both variables have been displaying positive trends in
the region in the last forty years, which is a suggestive eye-ball evidence at this stage in the
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Figure 1: Democracy (POLITY ) and income per capita (GDP), Latin America, 1970-2007. Sources:
Polity IV and Penn World Table ￿les.
In addition, we provide in Table One the correlation matrix, and what we can see
(without implying any causality at this juncture) is that there are positive and statistically
signi￿cant correlations between democracy and income (which somehow con￿rms the positive
trends shown in Figure One), and between democracy and urbanisation. The correlation be-
tween income and urbanisation is positive, as one would expect in developing and developed
societies alike. Also of some interest, the correlation between constraints on the executive
shortly after independence and contemporaneous democracy is negative, which descriptively
suggests that the low levels of institutional quality in the distant past might have had a
detrimental e⁄ect on the development of democracy much later on in time in the region.
6Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Latin America, 1970-2007.
POLITY GDP XCONST URBAN
POLITY 1
GDP 0.15* 1
XCONST -0.17* -0.58* 1
URBAN 0.21* 0.88* -0.69* 1
Sources: Polity IV and Penn World Table ￿les. * represents signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Finally, in Figure Two we provide the OLS regression line between democracy and
income per capita. The regression line is suggesting, and somehow con￿rming the previous
descriptive evidence, a positive (economic this time) relationship between our two main
variables of interest, or that the modernisation hypothesis, which suggests that a particular
level of income is a pre-requisite for democracy to thrive, might well be valid in the region,













8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9
mgdp
mpolityn Fitted values
Figure 2: OLS regression line, democracy and income per capita, Latin America, 1970-2007. Sources:
Polity IV and Penn World Table ￿les.
In essence, the above preliminary descriptive evidence, with all its known caveats, sug-
gests that in one way or another democracy and income have been positively related to each
other in the region, at least in recent times which capture the latest democratisation wave
being experienced in Latin America. To put it another way, the modernisation hypothesis,
which suggests that democracy needs a certain level of development to survive, seems to be
alive and well in the region.
B. Methodology
In terms of empirical strategy, since we have a panel of nine Latin American countries
(N = 9) covering the period between 1970 and 2007 (T = 38), we follow the previous
8literature and make use of dynamic panel (time-series) data analysis.
Firstly, we use the one-way Fixed E⁄ects (FE) estimator with robust standard errors for
the correlation of residuals over time, which assumes heterogeneity of intercepts (a reasonable
assumption in such a diverse panel of countries), and which makes use only of the within (￿ yi￿
￿ y) variation in the data, which purges the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
and the regressors. Essentially, the FE estimator under T ! 1, not only minimises the
Nickell bias present in short T dynamic panels, but also reduces statistical endogeneity and
provides consistent estimates of the expected values.
Secondly, although we attempt to use￿ given data availability￿ the most common vari-
ables in the literature, one would argue that omitted variables, measurement error, and even
some sort of (statistical or economic) endogeneity might be present. Therefore, we initially
make use of the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables (FE-IV) estimator which provides
asymptotically consistent and e¢ cient estimates as T ! 1, with the ￿rst and second lags of
income per capita as our identifying instruments for GDP and lagged GDP respectively (the
growth literature suggests that democracy, income and growth rates are somehow related)3.
Furthermore, controlling for the number of instruments￿ and for what we instrument￿
to avoid over￿tting (Bond (2002) and Roodman (2009)), we carefully make use ￿rstly of
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991) First-Di⁄erence GMM (DIF-GMM) which is based on the idea of using lags in levels
(yit￿2;:::;yi1) as instruments for the ￿rst-di⁄erenced model. Moreover, we take into account
the fact that persistent series might lead to weak instruments (and to a non-negligible small
sample bias) and make use of the GMM estimator that combines the usual moment conditions
for the DIF-GMM model above, with those extra conditions for the model in levels (￿yit￿1),
SYSTEM (SYS), or the SYS-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Basically we instrument for the lagged dependent variable with
levels dated t￿3 and earlier, a standard assumption, and then again for GDP. We therefore
use these two GMM estimators, collapsing the lag range with robust standard errors and
9the small-sample correction provided by Windmeijer (2005) to avoid "too good to be true"
standard errors.
All in all, the above-mentioned dynamic panel estimators take into account not only
the fact that those countries in the sample share particular characteristics, but also the
fact that such a panel is, no doubt, heterogenous (some of the countries in the sample are
more developed than others, or more or less urbanised than others). Moreover, some of these
estimators take into consideration the possibility of omitted variables and measurement error
biases, and (statistical and economic) endogeneity and persistence issues, which are always
advantageous for our purposes here. The estimated di⁄erenced DIF-GMM dynamic equation
is as follows,
(1) ￿POLITYit = ￿￿GDPit + ￿￿URBANit + ￿￿XCONSTit + ￿￿POLITYit￿1 + ￿￿it;
where POLITY is the Polity IV proxy for democracy, GDP is income per capita, URBAN
is the share of urban population, XCONST accounts for constraints on the executive right
after independence and POLITYit￿1 is the lagged dependent variable.
C. Results and Discussion
In this section we initially test for the modernisation hypothesis on its own, and then
secondly we also test for the critical junctures hypothesis.
In Table Two we ￿rstly report the ￿xed e⁄ect estimates of GDP and URBAN on
POLITY . More speci￿cally, in the ￿rst column of the ￿rst panel we report the role of
contemporaneous income on democracy and the estimate is positive and statistically signi￿-
cant. In the second column we allow for some lagged adjustments and regress the ￿rst lag of
income against democracy and the estimate is again positive and signi￿cant. In both cases
the variable URBAN displays the expected positive signs against democracy.
Moreover, in the third and fourth columns of the upper panel we make use of the FE-
10IV estimator, and the contemporaneous and lagged GDP estimates are again positive and
statistically signi￿cant against POLITY . The urbanisation variable displays the same sort
of positive and signi￿cant role on democracy as reported before. Also worth mentioning, the
identifying instruments are statistically signi￿cant and the F test indicates that the regressors
are jointly di⁄erent from zero in the ￿rst-stage regressions (available on request). In addition,
in all cases the lagged dependent variable, POLITY1, is positive and signi￿cant, con￿rming
the fact that democracy (or any political regime in general) tends to become persistent over
time.
In the second panel of Table Two we report the DIF-GMM (￿rst and second columns)
and SYS-GMM (third and fourth columns) estimates respectively. The DIF-GMM esti-
mates of contemporaneous and lagged income per capita are positive and mostly signi￿cant.
The size of these estimates are bigger than previously, presumably because of the external
variation provided by the set of instruments used. The SYS-GMM estimates are positive,
however not statistically signi￿cant. The URBAN estimates are not entirely clear cut this
time, however not signi￿cant either. As before, the lagged dependent variable presents posi-
tive and signi￿cant estimates, highlighting the persistence of political regime characteristics
over time. The Arellano and Bond test for second-order serial correlation and the Sargan
test for overidenti￿cation do not suggest any proliferation of instruments in these cases.
11Table Two: FE and GMM Estimates
Dynamic Models
POLITY FE FE FE-IV FE-IV
GDP .373 (6.60) .348 (2.53)
GDP1 .331 (6.32) .296 (2.02)
URBAN .813 (3.15) .799 (3.01) .818 (3.07) .797 (2.83)
POLITY1 .788 (35.09) .792 (32.62) .790 (24.80) .788 (23.54)
F test 819.49 789.33 473.43 429.57
POLITY DIF-GMM DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP 1.59 (2.60) 1.26 (1.33)
GDP1 1.93 (1.74) .653 (1.17)
URBAN 2.81 (0.73) 1.35 (0.28) -3.71 (-1.72) -.530 (-0.13)
POLITY1 .498 (4.69) .429 (2.66) .513 (2.69) .701 (8.09)
m2 (p) 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
Sargan (p) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. POLITY is the proxy for democracy,
GDP is income per capita, URBAN is the share of urban population and XCONST are the constraints
on the executive. FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, FE-IV is the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables, and the
DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM are the First Di⁄erence and System Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In the ￿rst panel of Table Three we report the FE and FE-IV contemporaneous and
lagged estimates of income per capita on democracy, and all estimates are positive and
statistically signi￿cant as well as the URBAN estimates. In addition, in order to test for
the critical junctures hypothesis, we now include constraints on the executive right after
independence (XCONST) on the right hand side of those equations, and although those
estimates present a negative sign (suggesting that the institutional body implemented shortly
after independence was not ideal for the development of democracy in the region), they are
not statistically signi￿cant. The lagged dependent variable keeps its positive and signi￿cant
12role, or its persistence over time. It is worth mentioning that for the FE-IV estimates, the
identifying instruments are statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst-stage regressions, as well as
the F-test for joint signi￿cance (available on request).
In the second panel of Table Three we report the DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM GDP
estimates on POLITY , and the DIF-GMM estimates are positive and mostly statistically
signi￿cant. The variable URBAN does not present entirely convincing estimates, however
they are not signi￿cant either. More importantly at this stage, the variable XCONST does
not present any sign of being statistically signi￿cant, just as before. The lagged dependent
variable maintains its positive and signi￿cant role, which con￿rms the fact that political
regimes tend to become entrenched over time. Also worth mentioning, the Arellano and
Bond, and Sargan tests do not present any sign of proliferation of instruments in these cases
either.
13Table Three: FE and GMM Estimates
Dynamic Models
POLITY FE FE FE-IV FE-IV
GDP .414 (5.00) .395 (2.75)
GDP1 .376 (5.16) .347 (2.24)
URBAN .786 (2.78) .768 (2.62) .790 (2.96) .769 (2.73)
XCONST -.067 (-1.11) -.066 (-1.10) -.065 (-1.10) -.068 (-1.10)
POLITY1 .793 (31.58) .797 (29.67) .794 (24.76) .791 (23.58)
F test 643.62 643.33 355.75 322.99
POLITY DIF-GMM DIF-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
GDP 1.47 (3.47) 1.23 (1.39)
GDP1 1.84 (1.52) .641 (1.20)
URBAN 2.23 (0.63) 1.07 (0.22) -3.20 (-1.31) -.286 (-0.07)
XCONST .165 (0.46) .077 (0.19) .224 (0.51) .083 (0.30)
POLITY1 .473 (4.71) .422 (3.03) .466 (3.99) .680 (8.04)
m2 (p) 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.27
Sargan (p) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 342. POLITY is the proxy for democracy,
GDP is income per capita, URBAN is the share of urban population and XCONST are the constraints
on the executive. FE is the Fixed E⁄ects, FE-IV is the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Variables, and the
DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM are the First Di⁄erence and System Generalised Method of Moments estimators.
In a nutshell, these dynamic panel estimates suggest that the modernisation hypothesis
holds in Latin America, or to put it di⁄erently, as predicted by Lipset (1959), a certain
minimum level of income and development has been of paramount importance in keeping
democracy alive and well in the region for the last forty years or so. Coincidentally enough,
income in the region is higher than in the ￿rst half of the 20th century, or even right after
WWII, and before this latest wave of political liberalisation, democracy had never set foot
14in the region for such a long time as currently. Also of importance, when we test for the
critical junctures hypothesis, put forward by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008
and 2009), we are not able to provide any hard evidence for the prediction that a particular
structural and institutional change, or shock, happening in the more distant past would
a⁄ect the development of democracy later on in time. In fact, we manage to provide even
more evidence for the modernisation hypothesis, which is of considerable importance for a
region that has been clearly maturing economically and politically in recent times4.
III. Final Observations
In this paper we have investigated the modernisation hypothesis, yet again we admit,
however this time speci￿cally the latest Latin American wave of democratisation a⁄ecting
the region in the last forty years or so. The results, based on dynamic panel (time-series)
data analysis, indicate that the modernisation hypothesis, which highlights the importance
of income and development for democracy to mature and survive, is alive and well in the
region, so far. In addition, we test for the critical junctures hypothesis, or the role of the
institutions implemented right after independence in those countries and whether they would
play any role in later democratisation processes, however we are unable to ￿nd any concrete
evidence for it.
The importance of this study is that we have been able to speci￿cally study the Latin
American case, with all its developmental idiosyncrasies, without having to incur in gener-
alisations which are not always warranted (in particular about the role of constraints on the
executive right after independence), nor to treat the region either as a dummy or as an out-
lier to be removed from the sample. With that we have been able to further our comparative
understanding of the recent history of the region in terms of development and democracy
during an eventful period of its history, which might also be of use to understand the impor-
tance of income on the current wave of democratisation a⁄ecting particular Arab countries.
All in all, the modernisation hypothesis holds in Latin America and there is no reason to
15believe that it will not hold in other regions, as long as a particular level of development is
in place.
Future research can be extended to further disaggregations and comparisons. For in-
stance, the wave of democratisation which a⁄ected Sub-Saharan Africa shortly after indepen-
dence in the 1960s can be studied as well as the transition economies from eastern Europe
which have been through important political and economic structural changes in the last
twenty years or so. Moreover, needless to say that understanding the current Arab Spring
is of paramount importance, and the analysis conducted here can be extended to that par-
ticular group of countries when data becomes available in the future. Finally, the role of
education is also important, however we still lack annual data on education attainment in
the region, which somehow precludes us on carrying such a study for Latin America.
Essentially, perhaps the main lesson from the above analysis is the need for a return to
the basics in terms of understanding democratisation processes, and the role and relevance
of economic development in keeping democracy alive. This is interesting in itself, since the
lesson, or the main implication, coming from the results is the fact that democracy seems to
be a political arrangement which thrives only when there is a particular level of development
already in place, and as a counterfactual the experiences of Sub-Saharan African in the 1960s
and Iraq now unfortunately come to mind. All in all, it seems that there is very little added-
value in implementing particular democratic institutions in places which are simply nor ready
for the complexities of a new political regime, which highlights the need for development so
that democracy can be enjoyed to its full.
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2Argentina got independence in 1816 and the data cover the period between 1825 and
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on request.
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